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1. Research question: 
 
Topic: Cartels and competition Law. 
Thesis: Cartels, Pro or Anti Competition? 
 
1. What are cartels and why is it a controversial issue? 
 
a. History within the European Union  
b. Cases  
 
2. What background information is necessary to understand each point of view? 
 
a. Definition of Cartels  
b. Motives behind cartels 
 
3. What arguments are laid out to support cartels? 
4. What arguments are laid out to support the anti-competition perspective of cartels? 
5. Based on my research, what is my position about cartels? Why? 
 
 
2. Material and Method: 
 
 
From the legal perspective, a traditional assertive scheme of analyzing case law, legal texts and 
doctrine is applied. Moreover throughout present thesis the different elements and experimental 
findings shall be illustrated through different case studies. The reason for using case studies to 
exemplify and backup different essential and practical findings is that it reflects the everyday 
application. 
 
The material used comprises mainly of a considerable number of articles, books, primary and 
secondary legislation and relevant cases. 
 
3. Material and outline:  
 
The material used consists mainly in a significant number of scientific articles, books, primary and 
secondary legislation and relevant cases. The thesis aims at establishing the present state of 
competition law in the European Union, but we shall critically analyze the legal situation and 
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recommend different approaches. The method is legal dogmatic. Results from commercial research 
shall be used for the evaluation of the law and as a base for arguments regarding possible new 
advances of the law. A case study consisting of the Commission’s Decision in Case COMP/39406 – 
marine hoses shall be used as an outline and to exemplify how completion law works today in the 
European Union. The motives for choosing this Judgment, remains that from a legal perspective the 
marine hoses cartel is a fairly fresh Decision, which means it mirrors current legislation, moreover it 
contains essentials which are innovative to some degree. 
 
4. Introduction:  
 
Through the present paper we shall take a close look at the framework of cartels and create a debate 
to determine if indeed the same promote and increase competition, or on the contrary cartels could 
be seen as a direct assault to the principles of competition and therefore recognized as one of the 
most harmful anticompetitive conducts. 
 
We should take under consideration that competition itself is a basic mechanism of the market 
economy and is considered an important factor for the development of proper conditions for 
economic growth and prosperity. It is well known that competition aims to increase productivity and 
reduce costs so that individual firms and individual sectors and the economy as a whole operates 
more efficiently; and to stimulate innovation, to use the contest to obtain the favour of consumers, 
both consumers of intermediate industrial goods or end users of goods and services, to use the 
contest to serve those consumers as a stimulant to provide new products and to provide better ways 
of supplying services. 
 
Over the years the battle on cartels has become more and more powerful. Anti-Trust authorities 
around the world have strengthened their fight against cartels, consequently we shall carry out an 
analysis of the horizontal cooperation agreements and we shall seek to determine if in fact the same 
serve as a tool to engage a disguised cartel. 
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5. Case COMP/39406 – marine hoses outline: 
 
On 28 January 2009, the Commission adopted a decision relating to proceedings under Article 101 of 
the EC Treaty imposing a fine of over EUR 131 million(1) on six producers of marine hoses. 
 
There was a key novelty in the marine hoses case: it was the first to involve a search in a private home. 
The arrangement between the companies was a classic cartel with price-fixing and quotas, which the 
case team dealt with in little more than two years1. 
 
The investigation by the Commission uncovered evidence that during the relevant period the parties 
concerned by the decision had been participating in anticompetitive arrangements which consisted of: 
 
a) Allocating tenders, 
b) Fixing prices, 
c) Fixing quotas, 
d) Fixing sales conditions, 
e) Sharing the market geographically, and 
f) Exchanging sensitive information on prices, sales volumes and procurement tenders. 
 
Evidence uncovered revealed that, at least since 1986, members of the marine hoses cartel had been 
running a scheme to share out amongst themselves the tenders awarded by their customers. Under 
the scheme, any member of the cartel who received an inquiry from a customer would report it to the 
cartel coordinator, who, in turn, would allocate the customer to a ‘champion’, which means the 
member of the cartel who was supposed to win the tender. To make sure that the tender was awarded 
to the ‘champion, in the tendering procedure the cartel agreed on the prices that each of them should 
quote so that all their bids would be above the price quoted by the champion. 
 
Moreover the cartel members agreed on a number of measures to facilitate the implementation of 
the cartel: reference prices, quotas and sales conditions backed up by penalties to compensate any 
cartel members who lost tenders which the cartel had allocated to them to another member of the 
                                                 
1Competition Policy Newsletter, The Marine Hoses cartel, Maurits Pino. Number 2, 53 
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cartel. 
The marine hoses cartel was, therefore, in many ways a textbook example. In one important sense, 
however, it was different. An ex-employee of one of the undertakings involved in the cartel performed 
the role of coordinator. Cartel members communicated with the coordinator regularly by fax, e-mail 
and, sometimes, telephone for each new tender. The coordinator gave members market share reports, 
market development reports and specific instructions on their bids. In addition, the coordinator 
selected a ‘champion’ for each contract. This ‘champion’ would win the tender, while other members 
of the cartel would submit ‘cover bids’ so as not to give away the cartel2. 
 
Remedies: 
Under the 2006 Guidelines on fines (4), when determining the basic amount of the fine to be imposed, 
the Commission starts from the value of the undertaking’s sales of the goods or services to which the 
infringement relates in the relevant geographic area within the EEA. 
 
The Commission calculates the fines to be imposed on each undertaking concerned on the basis of the 
value of sales of each. As this was a worldwide cartel and EEA sales do not reflect the strength of the 
different parties, it is appropriate, in line with Point 18 of the Guidelines on fines, to apply the world 
market share of each undertaking to the total sales within the EEA. The criteria that were considered 
to determine the percentage of the undertakings’ sales were the nature of the infringement, the 
combined market share of the cartel members, the geographic scope of the cartel and the degree to 
which the cartel was implemented. On this basis, the percentage for the variable amount and the 
additional amount (‘entry fee’) was set. 
 
Although the cartel lasted from April 1986 to May 2007, a period of two years of only limited activity 
on the part of the cartel was excluded when calculating the fines. Therefore, for the purpose of setting 
the fines, the cartel was considered to have operated for more than 19 years, so the variable amount 
was multiplied by up to 19. There were no mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances 
(such as recidivism) other than leadership. The fines of two undertakings were increased because they 
played the leading role. Yokohama was the first undertaking to submit information and evidence 
                                                 
2Competition Policy Newsletter, The Marine Hoses cartel, Maurits Pino. Number 2 54. 
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which opened the door for the Commission to carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the 
alleged cartel. The fine imposed on Yokohama was reduced by 100 %. Manuli was granted a 30 % 
reduction. Parker ITR’s and Bridgestone’s contributions were not considered as being of ‘significant 
added value’. Therefore the Commission did not grant these two companies any reduction of their 
fine3. 
 
Decision: 
The following fines were imposed (with the duration of the infringement indicated in brackets): 
 
 Bridgestone Corporation (1 April 1986 to 2 May 2007): EUR 58.5 million, of which EUR 48.1 
million jointly and severally with Bridgestone Industrial Limited (19 December 1989 to 2 May 
2007). 
 Yokohama Rubber Company Limited, immunity applicant (from 1 April 1986 to 1 June 2006): 
EUR 0. 
 Dunlop Oil & Marine Ltd (12 December 1997 to 2 May 2007): EUR 18 million, of which EUR 16 
million jointly and severally with ContiTech AG (28 July 2000 to 2 May 2007), of which EUR 7.1 
million jointly and severally with Continental AG (9 March 2005 to 2 May 2007). 
 Trelleborg Industrie SAS (1 April 1986 to 2 May 2007): EUR 24.5 million, of which EUR 12.2 
million jointly and severally with Trelleborg AB (28 March 1996 to 2 May 2007). 
 Parker ITR Srl (1 April 1986 to 2 May 2007): EUR 25.61 million, of which EUR 8.32 million jointly 
and severally with Parker Hannifin Corporation (31 January 2002 to 2 May 2007). 
 Manuli Rubber Industries SpA (1 April 1986 to 1 August 1992 and 3 September 1996 to 2 May 
2007): EUR 4.9 million4. 
6. Cartels prohibition within the European Union: 
The definition of cartels in accordance to the Oxford dictionary is; an association of manufacturers or 
suppliers with the purpose of maintaining prices at a high level and restricting competition5.  
 
                                                 
3
 Competition Policy Newsletter, The Marine Hoses cartel, Maurits Pino. Number 2 54 
4
 Competition Policy Newsletter, The Marine Hoses cartel, Maurits Pino. Number 2 54.  
5
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/cartel 
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The legal rule prohibiting cartels are found mainly in Article 101(1) in the Treaty of the functioning of 
the European Union, which stipulates that: 
 
 “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market, in particular the direct or indirect fixing of 
purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions, the limitation and control of production, 
markets, technical development, or investment and the allocation of markets or sources of supply are 
prohibited.6 
 
In order for collusive behaviour to be considered illegal under Article 101(1) three distinct components 
must be present: (i) a legal component; (ii) an economic component; (iii) a jurisdictional component.78  
The necessary present of a legal component means that some form (agreement or concerted practice) 
of cooperation must be entered into between undertakings.9 The necessary present of an economic 
component means that there must be a restraint of competition (prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition). The necessary present of a jurisdictional component means that agreement must be 
capable of affecting trade between Member States. 
 
Even though an agreement or concerted practice might fall under the scope of Article 101(1) it still has 
the possibility to be cleared by the Block exemptions. The Block exemptions fall into three categories, 
Article 101(3), agreements of minor importance and block exemptions. 
 
The first category is Article 101(3). Article 101 (3) creates an exemption where the agreement is 
beneficial to consumers. In order to satisfy the criteria and obtain a Block exemption four conditions 
                                                 
6
Article 101(1) Treaty of the function of the European Union 
7
The jurisdictional component will not be further elaborated on. 
8
Iversen, Bent et al. “Regulating competition in the EU”, 2008 p. 29 
9
Article 101(1) does not define the term undertaking and instead it has been developed through a number of cases before 
the ECJ. In Höfner and Elser v. Macotron, the ECJ established that “the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity 
engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity or the way in which it is financed.” See Case C-
41/90, Höfner and Elser v. Macotron GmbH, para 21. The term will not be further elaborated on 
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must be fulfilled; the conditions are cumulative, meaning that all conditions must be satisfied before 
obtaining an exemption. To give some guidance the Commission has issued a comprehensive notice 
on the application of Article 101(3).10 The first two conditions that have to be fulfilled are positive 
meaning that they must be present and the last two conditions are negative, meaning that they must 
not be present. First of all, the agreement must lead to an improvement in the production or 
distribution of goods or the promotion of technical or economic progress. Secondly, it must allow 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. Third, the agreement may not contain any 
indispensable restraints and finally, the agreement may not eliminate competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question.11 
 
All agreements may, in theory, meet the conditions in Article 101(3). In practice however, the 
Commission and the European Courts have made it clear that prices, outputs or market fixing 
agreements will rarely benefit from the exceptions, as they are considered restrictive of competition 
by their object (as explained below). Thus cartels are “almost” per se prohibited;12 however some 
exceptions have been made over time to this general view. For instance, the Commission has granted 
exemptions from competition rules for so-called Crisis cartels. 
 
The term "crisis cartels" is misleading as it may create expectations that competition authorities might 
envisage to allow cartels in order to protect industry from an economic crisis in general. However, the 
discussion of industrial restructuring agreements should not be related to the current, or any other, 
cyclical economic crisis and the recession induced fall in demand. In a properly functioning market 
economy it should normally be price that influences the changing relationship between supply and 
demand, and when demand falls it is likely that price would follow as well. If the consequence of a 
recession is that some undertakings go bankrupt, it would normally be those least adapted to the 
crisis for a number of reasons. Hence, it can be generally assumed that competition would correct the 
problem of overcapacity available in the market and, over time, it would bring the market back to 
equilibrium. Therefore, until this adjustment takes place prices must not be artificially maintained at a 
high level by means of a cartel. In line with this fundamental economic law of supply and demand, the 
                                                 
10
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
11
Iversen, Bent et al. “Regulating competition in the EU”, 2008 p. 58-62 
12
Massimo Motta,  “Cartels in the European Union: Economics, Law, Practice”, 2007 p. 14 
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case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union ("ECJ") generally concludes that a cyclical 
overcapacity in principle cannot justify the formation of cartels13. 
 
Prior to 1 May 2004, when the new notification system14 was introduced, an exemption under Article 
101(3) was only possible after notification to the Commission and the Commission’s approval. 
Regulation No 1/2003 abandoned the old notification system, the consequence of the abolishment of 
the old notification system (Regulation No 17) is that the restrictive practices which are prohibited by 
Article 101(1) but meet the trade-off contained in Article 101(3) is lawful without the need for any 
prior decision, therefore undertakings must themselves assess whether they are covered by the 
prohibition, and if so, assess whether they fulfil the conditions for exemption.15 
 
The second category is agreements of minor importance. The Commission has agreed to exempt 
'Agreements of minor importance'16 from Article 101 in cases where the deleterious effects on 
competition are found to be insignificant. The requirement that there was to be an appreciable 
restriction was first accepted by the ECJ in Völk.17 According to the above mentioned Notice18 
agreements between competitors do not appreciably restrict competition, where the aggregate 
market share held by the participants does not exceed ten (10%) percent. However, these thresholds 
do not apply to agreements which have as their object to fix prices, limit output or sales, or allocate 
markets or customers.19 
 
In this specific point we would like to refer to Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence 
and Others, judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 13 December 2012, where in 
reference to what the French Supreme Court indicated, the European Court of Justice agreed that “An 
agreement that may affect trade between Member States and which has an anti-competitive object 
constitutes, by its nature and independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an appreciable 
                                                 
13
 Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques ” Global Forum on Competition CRISIS CARTELS 
Contribution from the European Union” , 2011 p. 3 
14
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
15
Iversen, Bent et al. “Regulating competition in the EU”, 2008 p. 57 
16
Commission Notice on agreement of minor importance (2001) OJ C368/13 
17
Case 5/69, Völk v. Vervaecke 
18
Commission Notice on agreement of minor importance (2001) OJ C368/13,  para 7 
19
Commission Notice on agreement of minor importance (2001) OJ C368/13,  para 11 
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restriction on competition (para 37). This, in essence, means that when an agreement between 
undertakings has an anti-competitive object and is capable of appreciably affecting trade between 
Member States, it is assumed that this agreement is also capable of appreciably restricting, distorting 
or preventing competition. 
 
According to the previous case law (see in that regard Völck/Vervaeke) an agreement restricting 
competition by object or by effect, falls outside the cartel prohibition when it “has only an 
insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons 
concerned have on the market of the product in question”. It seems that the Court in paragraph 37 
has now made a clear distinction between “object” and “effect”, in essence simplifying the test by 
assuming appreciable effect on competition with regard to agreements that fall within the “object” 
category. It can be argued that this will make proving the existence of an infringement easier for the 
National Competition Authorities and Courts. Nevertheless, appreciable effect on trade between 
Member States still needs to be identified.  
 
The Notice is accompanied by a Commission Staff Working Document that aims to help companies 
assess whether or not the notice applier to their agreement. The Staff Working Document acts as a 
checklist, outlining the types of restrictions that have already been categorized as object of hardcore 
restrictions such as price fixing, market sharing, output restrictions, bud rigging and information 
sharing are listed. In agreements between non-competitors, examples include sales restrictions on 
buyers and licensees and resale price maintenance. 
 
The Commission will update this document to reflect any development vis-á-vis object or hardcore 
restrictions, but is also keen to emphasize that it will not prevented from finding object restrictions in 
the future that are not listed in the guidance paper. 
 
The notice does not represent a significant change from the original framework for assessing 
agreements of minor importance between companies with low market shares. Instead it represents a 
codification of the European Court of Justice decision in Expedia, clarifying that any agreement 
containing an object or hardcore restriction will be automatically deemed to appreciably restrict 
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competition and therefore and therefore cannot benefit from the safe harbor. It should be noted, 
however, that such agreements still need to affect trade between Member states in order to trigger 
the Commission’s jurisdiction to assess them under Article 101 TFEU20.  
 
The third category is the block exemptions. The Commission has also introduced a collection of block 
Exemptions for different types of contracts. These include a list of contract terms which will be 
permitted and a list of those which are banned from these exemptions. For instance Regulation 
2658/2000, which applies to specialisations agreement and Regulation 2659/2000, which applies to 
Research and Developments agreements. 
 
Severe consequences may result for the members of a cartel agreement. The immediate consequence 
of the agreement is that the agreement or concerted practice is according to Article 101 (2), declared 
void. In other words, it has no legal effect.21However the sanction of invalidity would not be much of a 
threat to cartel members as they are unlikely to be concerned about their inability to enforce the 
agreement in court.22 Because, as discussed previously, one of the factors to the operation of a 
successful cartel is that a proper punishments mechanisms is put in place within the cartel. The cartel 
members´ concern is instead on the risk of investigation by the Commission and the likelihood of a 
huge fine if breach is detected. 
 
Retaliation or punishment is a means by which members of a cartel can ensure that other members 
do not deviate from the agreed price or output. The existence of such a mechanism is critical if the 
cartel is to be sustained over time. The harsher the punishment (with other factors remaining 
constant), the less the firms are to deviate from the collusive outcome. 
 
This holds for both for explicit cartels, those normally outlawed by competition law, and for “tacit” 
collusion or coordination. Coordinated behaviour is usually note prohibited as such under competition 
rules if no explicit communication is involves (with some exceptions, i.e. Spain), but is of relevance to 
the assessment of the degree of competition in other contexts, particularly merger control. 
                                                 
20
 http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2175890/eu-competition-and-regulatory-newsletter-27-june-03-july-
2014.pdf  
21
Iversen, Bent et al. “Regulating competition in the EU”, 2008 p. 63 p. 63 
22
A. Jones and B. Sufrin, ”EC Competition law: Text, Cases, and Materials”, 2008 p. 125 
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Coordinated behaviour is one criterion under the “substantial impediment to effective competition” 
(SIEC) test under the 2004 Merger Regulation (139/2004), i.e. a merger can be prohibited if it is 
deemed to lead to a market structure that is conductive to coordinated effects23. 
 
The standard of proof for the existence of a retaliation mechanism within the European Union merger 
control rules was unclear until 2002. The legal precedent was set in the context of the merger of tour 
operators Air-tours and First Choice. As part of the merger assessment in 1999, the European 
Commission argued that it was not necessary for it to consider the existence of a retaliation 
mechanism to assess the possibility of coordination post-merger.24  
However, the Court of First Instance (CFI) revisited the commission’s decision in 2002 and disagreed 
with this conclusion, ruling that assessment of the possibility of retaliation is important when 
analysing the possibility of retaliation is important when analysing the stability of coordination 
 
From this general introduction it can be seen that the Commission has a strict view on price, output 
and market fixing agreements, as they are excluded from all three categories of exemptions. 
7. Motives behind cartels: 
 
The legal concept of Cartel requires co-ordination between undertakings in the form of an agreement 
or concerted practice, together with the object or effect of distortion, prevention or restriction of 
competition. Thus the legal definition of Cartels naturally focuses mostly on more observable 
behaviour than on the outcome. Even though collusion from an economic perspective coincides with 
an outcome, it can occur both when firms act through an organized cartel (explicit collusion), and 
when they act in a purely non-cooperative way (tacit collusion).  Understanding the difference 
between the legal and economic concept of cartels and their interactions, it is necessary to briefly 
examine some of the most common motives behind them, to get an understanding of why firms are 
willing to join a cartel. Here, it must also be emphasized that the same entails several risks on the 
participants. 
 
                                                 
23
 AGENDA Advancing Economics in Business 2008 p. 1 
24
 Case No. IV/M.1524 .  Airtours/First Choice, September 22nd 1999.  
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1. Ability to Control Market/Industry Operations; 
2. Increasing Barriers of market Entry; 
3. Developing Alliances; 
4. Exchange of information; 
5. Unsatisfactory financial performance. 
8. Consequences of cartels vs. possible benefits from the horizontal cooperation: 
 
As can be seen from above, there are many motives and reasons why undertakings may opt to form 
part of a cartel, however in this section we shall examine the economic consequences of cartels and 
attempt to understand why the same may have a deleterious effect on welfare. Furthermore its 
comparison with the efficiency savings from the horizontal cooperation’s shall also be examined. 
 
We shall take under consideration in the progress of this analysis that cartels allow undertakings to 
utilize this market power and therefore, possibly misallocate resources, and redistribute income from 
consumers to producers, and to reduce the economic welfare. 
 
The question then is whether all colluding firms are able to raise prices and profit relative to the 
situation absent the cartel? Apparently the effect a cartel has on prices depends on the specific cartel, 
some cartels have succeeded in raising prices and profits and some haven’t. Some cross-section 
studies found that some did and Ecklos study25 of fifty-one cartels showed that in nineteen cases the 
cartels were able to raise prices 200 percent above the unit cost of production and distributing. An 
interesting observation in both Griffin (1989) and Eckbo (1976) studies26 is that cartels are more 
successful at increasing prices, when some of the structural factors, discussed above, which facilitate 
collusion, such as seller concentration, small number of firms, homogeneity in cost and size is present. 
Thus there is an indication that factors facilitating collusion also have a positive effect on the ability of 
the cartel to increase prices. Other cross-section study also confirms that cartels are likely to increase 
prices.27 
                                                 
25
Levenstein and Suslow, ” What determines cartel success”, 2006 p. 80 
26
Levenstein and Suslow, ” What determines cartel success”, 2006 p. 80 
27
Levenstein and Suslow, ” What determines cartel success”, 2006 p. 81 
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It is difficult to estimate the effect of the marine hose cartel, but if we assume that the indication 
above is true, the marine hose cartel would have been successful at raising prices. Furthermore the 
cartel participants also indicate this in the Decision.28 
 
Particularly cartels harm consumers in urbanised society, as well as in the emerging countries. In 
adding together, cartelised industrial sectors lack competition which certainly reduces 
competitiveness in the long run and may have a negative impact on the overall performance of a 
country's economy. Widespread shapes of cartels conduct are: price fixing, market sharing, bid rigging 
and output control. 
 
Price fixing take places when competing businesses make an agreement that has the purpose or effect 
of fixing, controlling or maintaining the price of goods or services prices. This may be in the form of 
agreed selling or buying; agreed minimum prices; agreed formula for pricing or discounting goods and 
services; agreed rebates, and allowances or credit terms. 
 
8.1 Possible pro-competitive effects of information exchanges: 
 
If information exchange does not give rise to the competition concerns which will be discussed further 
below, it will almost always be positive to welfare. Indeed, the benefits from information exchange can 
be significant both for suppliers and customers. 
 
Information exchange can improve product positioning, particularly in industries with product 
differentiation or in multimarket industries. Experimental evidence indicates that lack of information 
may induce firms to position their products in a way that neither maximises their profits nor consumer 
welfare.29 Allowing information exchange in these settings can therefore improve consumer surplus 
and welfare. 
 
Although there is little empirical evidence in the economic literature on this, information exchange 
                                                 
28
Case COMP/39406, Marine Hoses, 2008 p. 53 
29
 See Kruse and Schenk, 2000. 
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may also improve companies’ investment decisions.30 As Hovenkamp points out: “firms respond to 
uncertainty by being less aggressive. If the manufacturer has no idea about future demand for its 
product, it will hedge its bets, which in this case means building a smaller plant or making fewer 
purchases of inputs. By contrast, good market information reduces uncertainty and gives sellers more 
confidence about their investment and, accordingly, more incentive to invest” and “generalised pricing, 
output and inventory data can be useful in guiding firms to make intelligent decisions about how much 
to invest in plant and equipment, how much to plan on producing the following year, and the like.”31 
 
There are industry sectors where a certain degree of transparency is required for the industry to work 
effectively. For example, in the banking and insurance industries, information sharing on individual 
consumers’ risks can reduce the problems of adverse selection (where firms cannot tell good 
consumers from bad consumers) and moral hazard (where a consumer who is protected from risk may 
behave differently than if fully exposed to the risk). In these circumstances, information sharing 
mechanisms fill an asymmetry of information about customers and thus allow the industry to operate 
efficiently.32 
 
8.2 Information exchanges in the insurance sector: 
 
It is recognized that in the insurance sector a certain degree of cooperation between competitors is 
necessary to the correct functioning of the industry itself and, furthermore, it leads to an increase of 
competition between the insurance companies. For this reason, the European Commission has 
adopted a Block Exemption Regulation to exempt categories of horizontal agreements between 
insurance companies.33 The rationale for block exempting certain information flows within the 
insurance sector is that calculations, tables and studies make it possible to improve the knowledge of 
                                                 
30
 Christiansen and Caves (1997) have looked at the impact of the exchange of information on capacity expansion in the 
pulp and paper industry and at its effect on the investment rivalry. They note that if markets are not too concentrated, 
non-binding information exchange (“cheap talk”) can solving the strategic uncertainty about rivals’ investment decisions 
and may therefore improve economic efficiency overall. 
31
 See, Hovenkamp, 1999, p. 43 et seq. It has also been argued that “neglecting the role of information exchange on 
investment decisions implies neglecting potentially large costs for consumers leading to distortions with respect to 
product quality, product variety, location and the future ability to respond to demand changes”(see Nitsche and von 
Hinten-Reed, 2004). 
32
 See Padilla and Pagano, 1999.  
33
 See Regulation 267/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the TFEU. 
18 
 
risks and facilitate the rating of risks for individual companies. This can in turn facilitate market entry 
and thus ultimately benefit consumers. However, no unnecessary restrictions of competition are 
covered by the block exemption. For instance, agreements on commercial premiums are not 
exempted; and calculations, tables or studies are only exempted if they (a) do not identify the 
insurance companies concerned or any insured party; (b) when compiled and distributed, include a 
statement that they are non-binding; and (c) are made available on reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms, to any insurance undertaking which requests a copy of them, including 
insurance undertakings which are not active on the geographical or product market to which those 
calculations, tables or study results refer. 
8.3 Information exchanges in the banking industry: 
 
A similar rationale in the banking industry lead to the creation of public and private credit registers 
across the EU between 1997 and 2007. The establishment of these registers can facilitate direct entry 
through a reduction of information asymmetries, which in turn intensifies competition.34 In the Asnef-
Equifax case,35 the Court of Justice for the European Union (the ‘CJEU’) was asked to review the 
compatibility with the European competition rules of an online register set up by the Spanish 
association of financial institutions. The register contained sensitive information on existing and 
potential borrowers, such as past credit history, failures to pay, outstanding credit balances etc. The 
purpose of the register was to better inform lenders as to risks connected with granting loans, leading 
to greater and more efficient availability of credit. The Court of Justice for the European Union 
concluded that the information exchanged on the creditworthiness of potential borrowers served to 
reduce the risk of lending by reducing the disparity between the information available to credit 
institutions and that held by potential borrowers. Therefore, the information exchange was capable of 
reducing the number of borrowers who default on repayments, and hence improved the functioning 
of the credit supply system as a whole, leading to a more efficient market outcome. As the credit 
register was designed to limit risks of credit institutions in granting loans, the Court concluded that the 
exchange of information did not have the object of restricting or distorting competition. 
 
                                                 
34
 See Gianetti, Jentzsch and Spagnolo, 2010. 
35
 Case C-238/05 of 23 November 2006. 
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Banking regulation originates from microeconomic concerns over the ability of bank creditors 
(depositors) to monitor the risks originating on the lending side and from micro and macroeconomic 
concerns over the stability of the banking system in the case of a bank crisis. In addition to statutory 
and administrative regulatory provisions, the banking sector has been subject to widespread “informal” 
regulation, i.e., the government’s use of its discretion, outside formalized legislation, to influence 
banking sector outcomes (for example, to bail out insolvent banks, decide on bank mergers or 
maintain significant State ownership)36. 
 
8.4 Potential benefits for consumers: 
 
Increased transparency and better knowledge of market conditions may also benefits consumers. In 
1961, Stigler emphasised the importance of search costs for consumers.27 Buyers need to identify 
sellers and their prices, customers need to search for knowledge on the quality of goods. The more 
information available on the market, i.e., on the products and services and their suppliers, the better 
placed consumers are to choose between competing products, as they will have a greater 
understanding of the product characteristics. Consumers can knowledgeably compare terms and 
conditions of the various offerings and freely choose the most suitable one for their needs. In these 
circumstances, enhanced transparency can benefit consumers by lowering consumers’ search costs. 
Behavioural economics has shown that better informed consumers can be instrumental in developing 
vigorous competition between suppliers.37  
 
Economic literature has also shown that information asymmetries and absence of information may 
not only distort consumer behaviour but may also adversely impact competition and competitive 
outcomes.38  In these circumstances, artificially increased transparency may improve consumer 
welfare.39 
                                                 
36
 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN REGULATED SECTORS SUBGROUP 1, Darryl 
Biggar, pp 2 
37
 For a further discussion of this, see Bennett, Fingleton, Fletcher, Hurley and Ruck, 2010. 
38
 See Klemperer, 1995, according to which high switching cost allow firms to maintain higher prices and earn higher 
profits. 
39
 Bennett and Collins (2010). 
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9. Possible anti-competitive effects of information exchanges: 
 
Despite the many pro-competitive aspects of information sharing between competitors, the literature 
also points out that such schemes may substantially harm consumers. The main way in which 
information exchanges can harm consumers is by facilitating collusion. Artificially increased 
transparency can allow firms to engage in, and sustain coordinated behaviour over time. However, 
whilst the primary concern is coordination, there are other non-coordinated theories of harm. 
 
To achieve and maintain over time a successful collusive equilibrium, three conditions must be 
cumulatively present. 40 
 
First, the colluding parties must be able to agree on a “common policy” and to monitor whether the 
other firms are adopting this common policy. It is not enough for each participant to be aware that 
interdependent market conduct is profitable for all of them; each member must also have a means of 
knowing whether the other operators are adopting the same strategy and whether they are 
maintaining it. In order to reach terms of coordination and to monitor adherence to them, market 
transparency is essential. 
 
Second, coordination must be sustainable – i.e., firms need to have an incentive not to depart from 
the agreed common policy. This in turn requires an effective retaliation mechanism. Thus, collusion is 
viable in the long-term only if there are adequate credible deterrence and punishment mechanisms 
that the cartel can put in place to ensure that no one departs from the common policy. 
 
Third, the foreseeable reactions of both customers and competitors must not be such as to undermine 
the common policy. If the jointly achieved price increase is likely to attract new firms in the market, or 
if customers are sufficiently strong or sophisticated to resist any attempt to jointly raise prices, it is 
unlikely that a collusive outcome can be achieved. Thus, reactions of current and future competitors, 
as well as of consumers, can jeopardize the results expected from the common policy. 
 
                                                 
40
 For further details, see Stigler, 1964; Carlton and Perloff, 1990; Phlips, 1995; Ivaldi, Rey, and Tirole, 2003; Scherer and 
Ross, 1990 and the extensive literature cited in these texts. 
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Various factors may facilitate the formation of collusive outcomes. Such factors include the 
concentrated structure of the market, the homogeneous nature of the product, costs symmetry, high 
entry/exit barriers, stability of demand and supply conditions, repeated interaction between the firms 
and multi-market contacts. But collusion can be reached and sustained if firms have complete and 
perfect information on the main variables of competition, such as the structure of the market, costs of 
the participants, their market strategies, etc. In this respect, market transparency is therefore a key 
factor that allows firms to align their strategy more easily and to promptly detect and punish any 
deviation from the agreed collusive terms. It follows that an information exchange may facilitate 
collusion if (i) it facilitates the reaching of a common understanding on the terms of coordination; (ii) it 
helps monitoring whether the terms of coordination are being followed; and (iii) it improves the ability 
or reduces the cost of punishing deviations from the terms of coordination. 
 
Reaching terms of coordination on prices or volumes may not be easy, particularly when a number of 
different collusive equilibria are possible. Information sharing arrangements artificially increase 
market transparency and thus are one of the facilitating factors for collusion.41 Information exchanges 
can facilitate this exercise as they offer firms points of coordination or focal points.42 In this way, it can 
help firms to coordinate their behaviour even in the absence of an explicit anti-competitive agreement. 
 
(ii) Artificially increased transparency allows firms to monitor adherence to the collusive arrangement, 
and provides better information on when and how to punish firms when they deviate.43 For collusion 
to be sustainable it is necessary that firms can detect deviations from the collusive equilibrium. The 
sharing of information may therefore support the internal stability of the collusive arrangement 
through greater precision in punishments of deviations. Firms will be in a better position to identify 
which firm has deviated and on what product, if they have access to precise and individualised 
information on their competitors. 
                                                 
41
 Albaek et al. 1997, for example, discusses the 1993 decision of the Danish competition authority in the concrete market, 
where firms decided to gather and publish firm-specific transactions prices for two grades of ready-mixed concrete in 
three regions of Denmark. Following initial publication, average prices of reported grades increased by 15-20% within one 
year. The authors investigate whether this was due to a business upturn and/or capacity constraints, but argue that a 
better explanation is that publication of prices allowed firms to reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition and, 
hence, led to increased prices. 
42
 See Levenstein and Suslow, 2006 
43
 See Genesove and Mullin, 2001. 
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(iii) Artificially increased transparency also allows existing firms to better identify opportunities for 
new entrants to enter the market and coordinate a response. This will increase the stability of the 
collusive understanding. 
 
In light of the above, information exchanges between competing firms can be expected to facilitate 
collusion when they diminish an existing information asymmetry, improve the accuracy in observing 
rival behaviour and improve transparency about future strategic intention of rivals.  
 
10. Efficiency savings from horizontal cooperation: 
 
As suggested by many economist, horizontal cooperation can be motivated by goals other than joint 
profit maximization which aim is to restrict competition, these other motivations goals are beneficial 
to societal welfare, thus it is necessary that competition law take these efficiencies into account, 
rather than focusing solely on the anti-competitive effects of cooperation.44 
 
The efficiency goals that can derive from horizontal cooperation can take the form of economies of 
scale and scope, advantages in marketing and distribution, and in research and development. 
Economic of scale refers to decrease in the firms average cost per unit, as the scale of output increases. 
Economic of scope refers to lowering average cost for a firm when producing two or more products. 
Advantages in marketing and distribution refer to the pooling and streamlining, the ability to offer 
distributors a broader product line and the sharing of advertising cost. Research and development 
refers to substantial cost savings through knowledge-transfer and innovation.45 
 
As can be seen from above several efficiencies can be derived from cooperation and the competition 
law needs to take these into consideration. 
 
                                                 
44
Roger J. Van den Berg and Peter D. Camesasca ”European competition law and economics – a comparative perspective” 
2001 p. 182 
45
Roger J. Van den Berg and Peter D. Camesasca ”European competition law and economics – a comparative perspective” 
2001 pp. 182-191 
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In December 2010 the European Commission (The Commission) approved two important regulations. 
In the first place, regulation (UE) 1217/2010 related to article 101 (3) of the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) to certain Research and Development agreements (R&D) and in second 
place, the regulation (EU) 1218/2010 related to article 101 (3) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) related to the specialization agreements. The regulations substitute the 
regulation of each of these areas that were previously approved in the year 2000. 
 
10.1 General aspects of the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines: 
 
With the new guidelines the Commission seeks to give clarity about what agreements of cooperation 
can be considered anti-competitive and which are considered exempted from the scope of art. 101 
TFEU, as its development is estimated positive for competition in general and consumers in particular. 
In this sense, the Commission has stated that the guidelines complement the Block Exemption 
regulations, the provide a framework for analysis to companies that have a duty to assess their 
Horizontal agreements in order to establish whether or not fall within the standard Prohibition 101 
TFEU (arts. 1 and 2 of Reg. 1/2003). 
 
Pursuant to Art. 50 of the Guidelines, the combination of activities, assets and technical knowledge 
within the framework of the Research and Development and specialization agreements, generally 
produce efficiencies that justify these behaviours, which fall outside the prohibition in art. 101 TFEU. 
However, except in cases covered by the Block Exemption regulations, it may be in the advance of 
efficiencies in the development of horizontal cooperation agreements, whose value in consequence 
should be made in light of the new guidelines of 2011 which replace the ones approved by the 
Commission in 2001. 
 
Cooperation is of "horizontal nature" if it is the subject of an agreement or concerted practice 
concluded between actual or potential competitors. These guidelines also cover horizontal co-
operation agreements between non-competitors (for example, between two companies active in the 
same product markets), but in different geographic markets without being potential competitors. 
Horizontal cooperation often leads to substantial economic benefits when it is the means to share risk, 
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save costs, increase investments, pool know-how, enhance product quality and variety, and launch 
innovation faster. On the other hand, horizontal cooperation can create competition problems when 
doing so causes negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety and quality of products. 
These guidelines provide an analytical framework for the most common types of horizontal 
cooperation agreements, in order to verify whether they are compatible with Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
 
These guidelines only apply to the most common types of cooperation: research and development 
agreements, production agreements, purchasing agreements, commercialization agreements, 
standardization agreements and information exchange. The agreements between companies at 
different levels of the production or distribution chain (vertical agreements) are in principle treated 
the Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical Restraints and the Guidelines on vertical restraints. 
However, to the extent that they could be held vertical agreements between competitors, they must 
be assessed according to the principles applicable to horizontal agreements. When, in addition to 
horizontal agreements affect concentration, the regulation on the control of concentrations applies. 
 
These lines are intended to set out the evaluation criteria for the application of the competition rules 
under Article 101 TFEU. Paragraph 1 of Article 101 TFEU is used to assess whether an agreement is 
capable of affecting trade between countries of the European Union (EU) has an anti-competitive 
object or actual or potential restrictive effects on competition. In the event that an agreement 
restricts competition, paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU determine if the benefits for competition 
outweigh the restrictive effects on competition. 
 
10.2 Evaluation criteria under paragraph 1 of Article 101 TFEU 
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits agreements which have as their object or effect the 
restriction of competition. For the purposes of these guidelines, the "restriction of competition" 
includes the prevention and distortion of competition. If the object of an agreement is to restrict 
competition, that is, by its very nature have the potential to restrict competition within the meaning 
of paragraph 1 of Article 101 TFEU, it is not necessary to examine the actual or potential effects of the 
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agreement. If, however, horizontal co-operation agreement does not restrict competition by object 
must be analyzed actual and potential effects to determine if there are appreciable restrictive effects 
on competition. To have restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of paragraph 1 of 
Article 101 TFEU, the agreement must or should have an appreciable adverse impact on at least one of 
the parameters of competition on the market such as prices, production, quality and product variety 
or innovation. Such restrictive effects assessment should be made taking into account the actual legal 
and economic context in which competition without the existing agreement would. 
 
The nature of an agreement is defined by elements such as the scope and objective of cooperation, 
competition between the parties and the scope of the combination of their activities. These factors 
determine which kind of possible problems of competences may arise. Horizontal cooperation 
agreements may limit competition in several ways. For example, production agreements may lead to a 
direct limitation of competition with lower production parts. The main competition problem of the 
agreements marketing is price fixing. 
 
Market power is the ability to profitably maintain a higher level of competition for some time or 
profitably maintain output in terms of quantity, quality and variety of products and innovation at a 
lower level price for certain time. The market power can sometimes result from reduced competition 
between the parties. 
 
The starting point of the analysis of market power is the position of the parties in the markets affected 
by cooperation. To analyze the position of the parties, it is necessary to define the relevant markets, 
using the Communication from the Commission on the definition of relevant market and calculate the 
cumulative market share of the parties. If the combined market share is small, it is unlikely that 
horizontal cooperation produce restrictive effects. Given the variety of cooperation agreements and 
the different effects they may cause in the markets according to the conditions prevailing in them, it is 
impossible to define a general market share threshold above which one might assume the existence of 
a power sufficient to cause restrictive effects market. 
 
Depending on the position of the parties and the concentration in the market, they may be taken into 
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account other factors such as the stability of market shares over time, entry barriers, and the 
likelihood of other entries in the market and the possibility of buyers / suppliers to counter the market 
power. 
10.3 Evaluation criteria under paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU 
 
When the presence of a restriction of competition within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 101 is 
established, the exception referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 101. Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 puts 
the burden of proof in the company that invokes the benefit of this provision. Therefore, there are 
four cumulative conditions must be met for cooperation agreements to be exempted: 
 
 The restrictive agreement must produce economic benefits such as improving the production 
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical and economic progress i.e., the efficiency 
gains; 
 
 The restrictions must be indispensable to achieve efficiency improvements; 
 
 Consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefit achieved by indispensable 
restrictions; 
 
 The agreement must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substance part of the products in question 
 
When these four criteria are met, it is considered that the efficiency gains generated by an agreement 
outweigh the competition generated. 
 
The guidelines provide general principles on the competitive assessment of information exchange, 
including assessment subject to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 101 TFEU which apply to all types of 
horizontal cooperation agreements that include the exchange of information. Information exchange 
can take various forms: competitors can share data directly, and data can be shared indirectly through 
a common agency or a third party suppliers or through companies or retailers. Information exchange 
can be beneficial for companies (e.g., helping companies save costs by reducing their inventories) or 
directly to consumers (for example, reducing their search costs and improving choice). However, 
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information exchange may also lead, in certain cases, to restrictive effects on competition, especially 
when you can make it possible for undertakings to be aware of market strategies of their competitors. 
Communication of information among competitors may constitute an agreement, concerted practice 
or decision in order to fix prices or quantities. These types of exchanges of information are considered 
signs and, as such, will be fined. Outside the field of cartels, information exchange is only considered 
to restrict competition by object where competitors exchange information individually relating to 
expected future prices or quantities. Exchanges of other types of information, including prices, are not 
treated as restrictions by object and evaluated in terms of their restrictive effect on competition. 
 
11. Types of cooperation agreements: 
 
These guidelines also define the characteristics of certain types of cooperation agreements and 
applied the analytical framework described above under paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 101 TFEU to 
each of the following types of agreements: 
 
11.1 Information Sharing Agreements 
 
Although there were already rules on information exchanges in the Guidelines on the application of 
art. 101 TFEU for the shipping sector, Commission addresses in detail the study of the exchange of 
information which may be considered adjusted to the competition rules and to eliminate the 
uncertainty about the strategic variables of competition are illegal. 
 
From the point of view of competition law, the first thing that indicates is that exchanges can take 
place in different contexts and can be tabled in different forms (par. 55 and 56). From the perspective 
of its legality or illegality, Guidelines indicate that necessary to evaluate not only the structure and 
characteristics of the market, but the kind of information exchanged. 
In order to determine whether the exchange of information is anticompetitive is necessary to examine 
the market conditions in which it takes place and determine to what extent the exchange modifies 
these conditions. In concrete terms, those agreements that create greater transparency in the markets 
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have greater potential to be anticompetitive to the extent that removes uncertainty about the key 
factors of competition between entrepreneurs. 
 
As for the characteristics of the information, the Commission indicates that there is greater restrictive 
potential in the exchange of strategic information. Such information may concern prices, customer 
lists, production costs, quantities, turnovers, sales, capacities, qualities, plans marketing, risks, 
investments, technologies and research programs and Development and their results. Additionally, it 
is necessary to establish whether the data exchanged is individualized or is added, the antiquity of the 
exchanged data, the frequency with which companies exchange information, the public or private 
nature of the data exchanged and its public or private character itself considered.  
 
For the agreement to be subject to sanctions is required in addition to the companies involved in the 
agreement to cover a substantial part of the market, which cannot be defined a priori as far as it 
depends on the circumstances and the structure itself. 
 
Established the anti-competitive nature, Section 95 to 104 of the Guidelines, address the assessment 
of information exchange agreements in light of the provisions of Section. 3 Art. 101 TFEU. In these 
sections the Commission carefully analyses the efficiencies that can generate this type of agreement, 
the need for it to be transferred to consumers in order that those who have contributed to its 
implementation may be waived and the need for said efficiencies are not achieved through a least 
restrictive means. 
11.2 Agreements on Research and Development (R&D): 
 
This kind of agreement is referred to the creation of improved products or improvement on existing 
product creation technologies or completely new technology. The regulation of the Research and 
Development also comprehends subcontracting agreements and accessory contract manufacturing or 
commercialization of the obtained results of the Research and Development. 
 
In order to assess the anti-competitive nature of these agreements it provides for the need to 
consider other aspects such as the credible competitors, the affected product market and calculation 
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of market shares (whether the proposal is to improve an existing product, as the development of a 
completely new one that will  replace those present on the market). 
 
It is indicated that the Research and Development agreements can generate competition concerns 
when reduce or delay the development and access to new products; they reduce competition 
between parties outside the agreement or encourage coordination behavior between competitors. 
The risk of exclusion only occurs in these cases when one of the operators involved in the conduct has 
significant market power. 
 
In order to ensure that the agreement remains outside the scope of the prohibition It will be 
necessary to demonstrate that the efficiencies are passed on to consumers, which are necessary to 
the extent that cannot be obtained on a means less restrictive and do not eliminate competition for a 
substantial part of the products or technologies in question. 
11.3 Production Agreements: 
 
Through such agreements one party or two or more parties agree performing the production. It is 
possible as stipulated in par. 150 of the Guidelines companies to produce through a joint venture or 
that it so through subcontracting agreements where one party (the "Contractor") entrusts to another 
party (the "subcontractor") the production of a good or service. 
 
Horizontal subcontracting agreements include agreements unilateral and reciprocal specialization as 
well as subcontracting agreements in order to expand production. 
 
From the perspective of par. 1 of Art. 101 TFEU production agreements they may limit competition 
between the parties which through its implementation manage to align their behavior, prices, 
exchange relevant information and other essential factors of competition. Such agreements may also 
lead to collusion regarding the provision of products, allowing supply reduction, lower quality and 
higher prices. Eventually this kind of agreements may create crowding third business when for 
example the production agreement allows participating companies increase the value of a necessary 
input for companies established in the markets "downstream". 
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The anti-competitive effects will depend as in other cooperation agreements we mentioned earlier, of 
the characteristics of the market in which it applies, the nature of the cooperation, its coverage and 
the nature of the product concerned. Also it depends on the market power that companies acquire 
which are part of the agreement. In any case it is necessary to consider if the potential restrictive 
effects will be greater if the production agreement entails distribution activities and joint marketing.  
 
In light of the provisions of par 3 on art. 101 TFEU production agreements can generate efficiencies on 
cost reduction and improvements in production processes. As in previous cases the company claiming 
exemption must demonstrate that the efficiencies are passed on to consumers, that there is no less 
restrictive means of achieving them and that the agreement does not eliminate full competition in the 
market for the products concerned. 
 
11.4 Purchasing Agreements: 
 
Par. 194 of the Guidelines provides that the joint purchasing agreements have aim to achieve a 
considerable bargaining power that may lead to lower prices or better quality of goods and services. 
The joint purchase can be performed by a jointly controlled company in which many other companies 
hold minority stakes, by contractual arrangement or by even less strict forms of cooperation called 
"joint purchasing arrangements". 
 
Purchasing agreements can generate their anti-competitive effects both buying market and the 
downstream market for the sale. Restrictions may be reflected in higher prices, reduced output, 
quality, innovation and product variety, problems in terms of market sharing or the exclusion of other 
potential buyers. 
 
Thus, in effect, those who attend the celebration of the purchase agreement have increased 
incentives to coordinate their behavior on the downstream market sale, can also demand their 
suppliers to reduce the quality of the goods supplied to him, diversity and generally innovations. The 
development of the agreements may also involve the exchange of business information essential that 
can facilitate coordination of prices and purchase volumes. 
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Purchase agreements may also exclude other companies that wish purchase a particular product and 
do not have the market power, that the companies that have enter the agreement acquired at the 
celebration of the agreement. 
 
In the extent of par. 3 Art. 101 TFEU purchase agreements can generate as noted in par. 217 of the 
guidelines, the efficiencies are represented in cost savings due to lower purchase prices and lower 
transaction costs, transport and storage. Additionally, these agreements may give rise to qualitative 
efficiency gains that encourage providers to innovate and launch market new or improved products. 
 
As in previous cases, the application of the exemption requires that whoever invokes have to prove all 
requirements under par. 3 art. 101 TFEU. 
11.5 Commercialization Agreements: 
 
In accordance to what is established in par. 225 of the Guidelines, this type of agreements held with 
the objective that two or more companies cooperate in the sale, promotion and distribution of its 
substituted products. The scope of these agreements may be higher as covering all distribution 
activities, or it can be much lower if only involves e.g. distribution, advertising and after sales service. 
 
Such agreements can generate among other restrictive effects setting prices, production constraints, 
the exchange of strategic information and segmentation and market sharing. The harmful effects on 
competition will depend on the extent of agreement on activities and power Market parties within 
them. 
 
It is likely that such resolutions are not restrictive of competition when needed so that one of the 
parties can be introduced into a market which would not been able to enter if it wasn’t for the 
agreement. 
 
 
As for the economic efficiencies that could lead to the exemption of the agreement if it meets the 
requirements of par. 3 art. 101 TFEU; the guidelines state that they cannot consist only of an 
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elimination of costs associated with competition, but they must result in benefits of integration 
economic activities. It also points out that pricing can only exceptionally justified to the extent that it 
is essential for the integration of other marketing functions, and this integration will generate 
substantial improvements. For its part, he notes par. 246 of the Guidelines; joint distribution 
agreements may generate economies of scale and scope particularly for small producers. 
 
As in previous cases, the efficiencies must be transferable to consumers, must be indispensable and 
that under no circumstances should allow that competition is completely eliminated within the 
market for products or services concerned. 
 
11.6 Standardization Agreements: 
 
The guidelines attempt to create a proper balance between the rules of free competition and 
adequate protection of intellectual property rules. The guidelines recognize as general rule 
standardization agreements and involving intellectual property rights, they are pro-competitive and 
only exceptionally they may be considered incorporated into the scope of Article 101 TFEU. 
 
Par. 257 of the Guidelines states that "The primary objective of the agreements standardization is to 
define the technical or quality requirements that products must meet or procedures and methods of 
current and future production.” 
 
Meanwhile par. 259 referring to the standard terms points out that “In certain industries companies 
use standard terms and conditions of sale or purchase elaborated by a trade association or directly by 
the competing companies (‘standard terms’) (4). Such standard terms are covered by these guidelines 
to the extent that they establish standard conditions of sale or purchase of goods or services between 
competitors and consumers (and not the conditions of sale or purchase between competitors) for 
substitute products. When such standard terms are widely used within an industry, the conditions of 
purchase or sale used in the industry may become de facto aligned (5). Examples of industries in 
which standard terms play an important role are the banking (for example, bank account terms) and 
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insurance sectors. 46 
 
From the point of view of competition, standardization agreements may restrict competition where 
they promote price agreements, limit or control production, innovation and development of technical 
markets. They may also have restrictive effects when preventing the entry of new competitors in a 
market by limiting their access to technology standardized set overcharges for such access or just 
unreasonably delay the entry of new competitors and the development of new technological 
developments. 
 
Within the set of standardization agreements, the Guidelines place special emphasis on agreements 
relating to Intellectual Property Rights distinguishing three sectors in this area. The sector for 
developers and technology sellers and therefore has a special interest in the costs of Intellectual 
Property Rights; the technology companies that acquire and sell, whose interest is to reduce the costs 
paid by Intellectual Property Rights, and the sector of vertically integrated companies that they are 
present both in the level of sales as in the Intellectual Property Rights distribution products developed 
with technology derived from the Intellectual Property Rights.   
 
As the Guidelines require, if the standard reference on Intellectual Property Rights exist, is possible 
that unjustified restrictions of competition arise, when for example the Intellectual Property Rights 
holder does not allow access to standard technology, do not access your licensing or what makes 
excessive costs, which not only prevent access of consumers but also the development of competition 
in the particular market where the standard applies. To avoid such restrictions the Guidelines establish 
that in order to ensure effective access to the standard, should be required to Intellectual Property 
Rights holders who are concerned that their rights are included in the standard, that promise in 
writing and in a irrevocable license to provide their essential Intellectual Property Rights to all third 
parties under fair conditions, reasonable and non-discriminatory agreement they are called FRAND 
(fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms) commitment covered in detail in paras. 287-291 of 
the Guidelines.     
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operation agreements 14.1.2011, Art 259  
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In the case of the standard terms of their restrictive effects may occur when they limit the range of 
products or innovation, such effects are only likely if the standard terms define the scope of the final 
product. In particular such agreements could affect price competition and this also may have harmful 
effects if the standard terms become frequently in a market and therefore can restrict access to it. 
 
As for the benefits derived from the standard terms par. 312 of the Guidelines emphasizes that this 
kind of agreements can facilitate customers comparison of the conditions offered and thus, changing a 
company another. Additionally, they may lead to efficiency gains in savings in transaction costs and 
may facilitate market entry in certain sectors which legal forms are complex. In these cases, the 
person who invokes the Application of par. 3 Art. 101 TFEU, is further proof that the arrangements are 
essential, that is, the efficiencies are not invoked could be obtained through less restrictive means that 
the efficiency gains you can pass on to consumers and that the agreements do not eliminate the 
Competition for full respect of the products or services concerned. 
 
312. The use of standard terms can entail economic benefits such as making it easier for customers to 
compare the conditions offered and thus facilitate switching between companies. Standard terms 
might also lead to efficiency gains in the form of savings in transaction costs and, in certain sectors (in 
particular where the contracts are of a complex legal structure), facilitate entry. Standard terms may 
also increase legal certainty for the contract parties47. 
 
12. Conclusion: 
 
Following George Stigler (1964), many economists assume that incentive problems undermine 
attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output. But the potential profits from collusion 
can create a powerful incentive as well. Theory cannot tell us, a priori, which effect will dominate: 
whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question. We conclude that many cartels do 
survive, and that the distribution of duration is bimodal. While the average duration of cartels across a 
range of studies is about five years, many cartels break up very quickly (i.e., in less than a year). But 
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there are many others that last between five and ten years, and some that last decades. Limited 
evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits, to varying degrees. Cartels can 
also affect other non-price variables, including advertising, innovation, investment, barriers to entry, 
and concentration. Cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring, 
but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in 
response to changing economic conditions. Cartels that develop organizational structures that allow 
them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive. Price wars that 
erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances. Sophisticated cartel 
organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter 
cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry48. 
 
Part of the difficulty in studying cartel success is that it depends on a wide variety of variables, and 
these variables are often not independent of one another. These include traditional structural 
variables, such as the variance in and concentration of demand, the structure and homogeneity of 
costs, and the rate of technological change. Cartel success also depends on organizational factors, 
such as the distribution of power within the cartel, its voting structure, the sophistication of 
mechanisms for detecting and deterring cheating, and the ability of the cartel itself to create barriers 
to entry. Cartel success depends as well on factors that are exogenous to the particular industry, such 
as government regulation and antitrust enforcement. Finally, cartel success depends on such 
idiosyncratic and history dependent determinants as how quickly the organization learns about cartel 
design, the startup costs of creating a cartel, and the reputation of cartel members49. 
 
In consistence with the objectives of present paper and the analysis of cartels and if in fact they may 
be considered pro or anti-competitive; the answer still seems to be relatively ambiguous. The 
exchange of information between competitors is a complex area of competition law. The economic 
and legal debate on the pro and anti-competitive effects of transparency on competition and firms’ 
incentives to collusion is likely to continue to affect the antitrust enforcement activities in this field. 
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This is an area of law which is deeply affected by the economic theories on implicit collusion, and 
where compliance with competition rules is therefore difficult. For this reason, companies are looking 
for legal certainties as to what kind of communications are allowed under competition law and as to 
which factors they should consider when entering into exchange of information systems with 
competitors. The distinction between exchanges of information within a traditional cartel context, 
exchanges of information as stand-alone infringements of competition rules, and pro-competitive 
exchanges of information will certainly benefit from clear guidance from antitrust enforcers. 
 
It is difficult to elaborate general and theoretical rules to distinguish a restrictive exchange of 
information from an exchange of information which is at least neutral. The approach must be on a 
case-by-case basis and we cannot ignore the economic context in which the participants to the 
information exchange are active, however it is right to say that although for years cartels have been 
seen as harmful to the market the same may in fact, when managed for the benefit of the consumer, 
can turn in a positive effect to the market, the consumer and of course the corresponding 
undertakings.  
 
As a recommendation we would suggest the different authorities to promote an open, competitive, 
environment without groundless restrictions on entry, ownership or exit, resulting either from the 
rules to be applied or from enforcement practices; ensure that there is a proper separation between 
the enforcement of sensible regulation and of the general competition rules; and apply in 
enforcement the usual tools of antitrust analysis, including market definition, market 
power/dominance, remedies. 
